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Abstract
Run-time type analysis allows programmers to eas-
ily and concisely define operations based upon type
structure, such as serialization, iterators, and structural
equality. However, when types can be inspected at run
time, nothing is secret. A module writer cannot use
type abstraction to hide implementation details from
clients: clients can determine the structure of these sup-
posedly “abstract” data types. Furthermore, access con-
trol mechanisms do not help isolate the implementation
of abstract datatypes from their clients. Buggy or mali-
cious authorized modules may leak type information to
unauthorized clients, so module implementors cannot re-
liably tell which parts of a program rely on their type
definitions.
Currently, module implementors rely on parametric
polymorphism to provide integrity and confidentiality
guarantees about their abstract datatypes. However,
standard parametricity does not hold for languages with
run-time type analysis; this paper shows how to general-
ize parametricity so that it does. The key is to augment
the type system with annotations about information-flow.
Implementors can then easily see which parts of a pro-
gram depend on the chosen implementation by tracking
the flow of dynamic type information.
1 Introduction
Type analysis is an important programming idiom.
Traditional applications for type analysis include serial-
ization, structural equality, cloning and iteration. Many
systems use type analysis for more sophisticated pur-
poses such as generating user interfaces, testing code,
implementing debuggers and XML support. For this rea-
son, it is important to support type analysis in modern
programming languages.
A canonical example of run-time type analysis is the
generic structural equality function.
fun eq[’a] = typecase ’a of
bool => fn (x:bool, y:bool) =>
if x then y else false
| ’b * ’c => fn (x:’b*’c, y:’b*’c) =>
eq [’b] (fst x, fst y) &&
eq [’c] (snd x, snd y)
| ...
The eq function analyzes its type argument ’a and re-
turns an equality function for that type.
Authors of abstract datatypes can use such generic
operations to quickly build implementations. For exam-
ple, because equality for the following Employee.t
datatype is structural, one may implement it via generic
equality.
module Employee = struct
(* name, SSN, address and salary *)
type t = string * int * string * int
(* An equality for this type. *)
fun empEq (x : t) (y : t) =
Generic.eq [t] (x,y)
end :> sig
type t
val empEq : t -> t -> bool
end
Although type analysis is very useful, it can also be
dangerous. When types are analyzable, software devel-
opers cannot be sure that abstraction boundaries will
be respected and that code will operate in a composi-
tional fashion. Consequently, type analysis may destroy
properties of integrity and confidentiality that the author
of the Employee module expects. Using type analy-
sis, anyone may create a value of type Employee.t.
Although the type will be correct, other invariants not
captured in the type system may be broken. For exam-
ple, malicious code can create employees with negative
salaries.
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Furthermore, even if the author of the Employee
module tries to keep aspects of the employee representa-
tion hidden, another module can simply use generic oper-
ations to discover them. For example, if no accessor was
provided to the salary component of an Employee.t,
malicious code could still extract it.
One answer to these problems is to simply prohibit
run-time type analysis. However, we believe the bene-
fits of type analysis are too compelling to abandon al-
together. Therefore, we propose a basis for a language
that permits type analysis, yet allows module writers to
define integrity and confidentiality policies for abstract
datatypes. In particular, we want authors to know: How
does changing the implementation of datatype affect the
rest of a program? How does code she writes depend on
the other abstract types they use?
In languages without type analysis, these questions
are easy to answer. Authors rely on parametric polymor-
phism to provide guarantees. The author knows the rest
of the program must treat her abstract datatypes as black
boxes that may only be “pushed around”, not inspected,
modified or created. Dually, authors are restricted in the
same fashion when using other abstract datatypes. In the
presence of type analysis, the programmer cannot know
what code may depend on the definition of an abstract
datatype. Any part of the program can dynamically dis-
cover the underlying type and introduce dependencies
on its definition.
In the past it has been suggested that type analysis
could be tamed by distinguishing between analyz-
able and unanalyzable types [6]. Unfortunately, just
controlling which parts of the program may analyze
a type does not allow programmers to answer our
questions. Imagine an extension, not unlike “friends” in
C++, where an author can specify which modules may
analyze a type. In the following code, modules A and B
may analyze the type A.t, and modules B and C may
analyze the type B.u.
module A = struct
type t = int
val x = 3
end :> sig
type t permit A, B
val x : t
end
module B = struct
type u = A.t
val y = A.x
end :> sig
type u permit B, C
val y : u
end
module C = struct
val z = case (Generic.cast [B.u] [int])
of SOME f => "It is an int"
| NONE => "It is not an int"
end :> sig
val z : string
end
Module C is not parametric with respect to A.t, even
though module C is not allowed to analyze A.t: If the
implementation of A.t changes, so does the value of
C.z. Despite restricting analysis of A.t to A and B, the
implementation of the type has been leaked to a third-
party. Furthermore, because the type B.u is abstract, the
author of A cannot know of the dependency. Access con-
trol places undue trust in a client not to provide others
with the capabilities and information it has been granted.
Consequently, we must look beyond access-control for
a method of answering the desired questions.
We propose that tracking the flow of type information
through a program with information-flow labels allows
a programmer to easily determine how their type defini-
tions influence the rest of the program. Information-flow
extends a standard type system with elements of a lattice
that describes the information content for each computa-
tion. For example, we could use a simple lattice contain-
ing two points L (low-security) and H (high-security).
A type boolH then means the expression it describes
could use “high-security” information to produce the re-
sulting boolean, while an expression of type boolL re-
quires only “low-security” information to produce its re-
sult. The novelty of our approach compared to previous
information-flow type systems is that we also label kinds
to track the information content of types.
To reason about abstract types in the presence of type
analysis, we label types with an information content that
can be tracked. Computations depending on those types
must also have that label.
module A = struct
type t = int
val x = 3
end :> sig
type tH
val x : tL
end
module B = struct
type u = A.t
val y = A.x
end :> sig
type uH
val y : uL
end
module C = struct
val z = case (Generic.cast [B.u] [int])
of SOME f => "It is an int"
| NONE => "It is not an int"
end :> sig
val z : stringH
end
In the revised example, sealing module Awith the sig-
nature sig type tH val x : tL end indicates
that the type definition t depends upon high-security in-
formation and the value x on only low-security infor-
mation. The type B.u and value C.z must both be
labeled as high security because they depend upon the
high-security information in A.t. The presence of a la-
bel H alerts the author of A to a dependency.
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Furthermore, only module A can create values of type
A.t that are labeled with L. Using type analysis to cre-
ate values of type A.t would taint the result with H.
Therefore, if module A requires its inputs be of type
A.tL, then it is impossible to use its functions with
forged values. The author now has a guarantee that mod-
ule invariants will be maintained and the integrity of her
abstraction will not be violated.
Information flow avoids the problems of access con-
trol because information must be propagated even when
no access occurs. For example, the identity function can
be assigned both the type A.tL →L A.tL and the
type A.tH →L A.tH witnessing that it propagates
the information content of the argument unchanged.
Here the function type→ is itself labeled to indicate the
information content of creating the function—creating
the identity function does not require any information.
In the next section, we describe a core calculus for
combining information-flow and run-time type analysis.
We then follow with our key contribution: By tracking
the flow of type information, it is possible to generalize
the standard parametricity theorem for languages with
run-time type analysis. This generalized theorem can be
used in the same manner as parametricity to establish
integrity and confidentiality properties.
2 The λSECi language
λSECi is a core calculus combining information flow
and type analysis. We designed λSECi to be as simple as
possible while still retaining the flavor of the problem. It
is derived from the type-analyzing language λMLi devel-
oped by Harper and Morrisett [6] and the information-
flow security language λSEC of Zdancewic [21].
2.1 Run-time type analysis
The grammar for λSECi appears in Figure 1. The
complete semantics for λSECi can be found in the ex-
tended version of this paper [19]. It is a predicative, call-
by-value polymorphic λ-calculus with booleans, func-
tions and recursion. Fix-points are separate from func-
tions to make nontermination aspects of proofs modular.
As in λMLi , type constructors, τ, which can be ana-
lyzed at run-time, are separated from types, σ, which
describe terms. We conjecture our results extend to
languages with impredicative and higher-order polymor-
phism, but for simplicity, we do not examine the prob-
lem in this paper.
The language of type constructors consists of the
simply-typed λ-calculus and two primitive constructors
that correspond to types: bool and τ1 → τ2.
kinds
κ ::= ?` | κ1
`→ κ2 types & operators
type constructors
τ ::= α | λα:κ.τ | τ1τ2 λ-calculus
| bool | τ1 → τ2 booleans & functions
| Typerec τ τbool τ→ analysis
types
σ ::= (τ)` injection
| σ1
`→ σ2 functions
| ∀`1α:?`2 .σ polymorphism
terms
e ::= true | false booleans
| x | λx:σ.e | e1e2 λ-calculus
| Λα:?`.e | e[τ] polymorphism
| fix x:σ.e fix-point
| if e1 then e2 else e3 conditional
| typecase[γ.σ] τ ebool e→ analysis
values
v ::= true | false | λx:σ.e | Λα:?`.e
term substitutions γ ::= · | γ, [e/x]
type substitutions δ ::= · | δ, [τ/α]
term variable contexts Γ ::= · | Γ, x:σ
type variable contexts ∆ ::= · | ∆,α:κ
Figure 1. The λSECi language
The term form typecase can be used to define oper-
ations that depend on run-time type information. This
term takes a constructor to scrutinize, τ, as well as two
branches: ebool and e→). During evaluation the construc-
tor argument is reduced to its head form so that the ap-
propriate branch can be chosen.
τ;
∗ bool
typecase [γ.σ] τ ebool e→ ; eint
τ;
∗
τ1 → τ2
typecase [γ.σ] τ ebool e→ ; e→[τ1][τ2]
We write e; e ′ to mean that term e reduces in a single
step to e ′ and τ ; τ ′ to mean that constructor τ makes
a weak-head reduction step to τ ′.
λSECi also includes a constructor, Typerec, allowing
types to depend upon type information. Without Type-
rec, it is impossible to assign a type to some useful terms
that perform type analysis [6]. Typerec implements a
paramorphism (a type of fold) over the structure of the
3
Proceedings of the 20th Annual Symposium on Logic in Computer Science (LICS’05) 
0-7695-2266-1/05 $ 20.00 IEEE 
L(?`) , ` L(κ1 `→ κ2) , `
L((τ)`) , ` L(σ1 `→ σ2) , `
L(σ1 ×` σ2) , ` L(∀`1α:?`2 .σ) , `1
Figure 2. Kind and type label operators
argument constructor. As in the following reduction
rules, when the head of the argument is one of the two
primitive constructors, Typerec will apply the appropri-
ate branch to the constituent types and the recursive in-
vocation of Typerec on the constituents.
Typerec (bool) τbool τ→ ; τbool
Typerec (τ1 → τ2) τbool τ→ ;
τ→ τ1 τ2 (Typerec τ1 τbool τ→ )
(Typerec τ2 τbool τ→ )
2.2 The information content of constructors
Information-flow type systems track the flow of infor-
mation by annotating types with labels that specify the
information content of the terms they describe. Because
our type constructors influence the evaluation of terms
in λSECi, we also label kinds.
Labels, `, are drawn from an unspecified join semi-
lattice, with a least element (⊥), joins (unionsq) for finite sub-
sets of elements in the lattice, and a partial order (v).
The actual lattice used by the type system is determined
by the desired confidentiality and integrity policies of
the program. Intuitively, the higher a label is in the lat-
tice, the more restricted the information content of a con-
structor or term should be. For most examples in this pa-
per, we use a simple two point lattice (⊥ for low security,
> for high security) that tracks the dynamic discovery of
a single type definition. In practice, any lattice with the
specified structure could be used. An example of a prac-
tical lattice with richer internal structure is the Decentral-
ized Label Model (DLM) of Myers and Liskov [10].
The labels on kinds describe the information content
of type constructors. The kind of a constructor (and
therefore its information content) is described using the
judgment ∆ ` τ : κ, read as “constructor τ is well-
formed having kind κ with respect to the type variable
context ∆.” The operator L(κ), defined in Figure 2, ex-
tracts the label of a kind.
Our calculus is conservative: If the label of κ is `,
then the information content of a constructor of kind κ is
at most `. The information level of a constructor can be
raised via subsumption. As kinds are labeled, the order-
ing v on labels induces a sub-kinding relation, κ1 ≤ κ2.
A kind ?`1 is a sub-kind of ?`2 if `1 v `2. Sub-kinding
for function kinds is standard. The relation is reflexive
and transitive by definition.
The label of a constructor τ of kind ?`, also describes
the information gained when the constructor is analyzed.
Type variables (such as Employee.t) may be given
a high security level so that their information content
may be traced throughout the program. For example, the
kind of a Typerec constructor must be labeled at least as
high as the analyzed constructor τ. This requirement
accounts for information gained by inspecting τ.
∆ ` τ : ?` ` v ` ′ ∆ ` τbool : κ
∆ ` τ→ : ?` ` ′→ ?` ` ′→ κ ` ′→ κ ` ′→ κ where ` ′ = L(κ)
∆ ` Typerec τ τbool τ→ : κ
By default the label on the bool constructor is set to ⊥.
The label of the kind for function constructors must be
at least as high as the join of its two constituent construc-
tors. This is because the label must reflect the informa-
tion content of the entire constructor.
The kinds of type functions, κ1
`→ κ2, have a label
` that represents the information propagated by invok-
ing the function. As shown below, the information, `, is
propagated into the result of application as κ2 unionsq `. This
is shorthand for relabeling κ2 with L(κ2) unionsq `.
∆ ` τ1 : κ1 `→ κ2 ∆ ` τ2 : κ1
∆ ` τ1τ2 : κ2 unionsq `
2.3 Tracking information flow in terms
The labels on types describe the information content
of terms. We use the judgment ∆? | Γ ` e : σ to mean
that “term e is well-formed with type σ with respect to
the term context Γ and the type context ∆?.” We use ∆?
to denote type variable contexts restricted to variables of
kind ?` for any label `. As we did for kinds, we define
(in Figure 2) the operator L(σ) to extract the label of
a type. Like constructors, the information content speci-
fied by labels for terms is conservative. The lattice order-
ing induces a subtyping judgment ∆? ` σ1 ≤ σ2, and
subsumption can raise the information level of a term.
The types of λSECi include the standard ones for func-
tions σ1
`→ σ2 and quantified types ∀`1α:?`2 .σ, plus
those that are computed by type constructors (τ)`. Note
that in the well-formedness rule for types formed from
type constructors, shown below, there is no need for a
connection between the label ` on the kind and the label
on the type.
∆
? ` τ : ?`
∆
? ` (τ)⊥
4
Proceedings of the 20th Annual Symposium on Logic in Computer Science (LICS’05) 
0-7695-2266-1/05 $ 20.00 IEEE 
That is because ` describes the information content of
τ, while the label ` ′ on (τ)` ′ describes the information
content of a term with type (τ)` ′ . It is sound to discard `
because once a constructor has been coerced to a type it
may only be used statically to describe terms and cannot
be analyzed.
Information flow is tracked at the term level analo-
gously to the type level. Term abstractions, σ1
`→ σ2,
like type functions propagate some information ` when
the are applied. Similarly, type abstractions, ∀`1α:?`2 .σ,
propagate some information `1 when they are applied.
The label `2 is part of the kind of α.
Like Typerec, typecase examines the structure of the
scrutinee and learns the information it carries, so the la-
bel ` ′ on the type of the term must be at least as high in
the lattice as the label ` on the scrutinee.
∆
? ` τ : ?`
∆
?
, γ:?` ` σ ` v ` ′ ∆? | Γ ` ebool : σ[bool/γ]
∆
?
| Γ ` e→ : ∀` ′α:?`.∀` ′β:?`.σ[α→ β/γ]
where ` ′ = L(σ[τ/γ])
∆
?
| Γ ` typecase [γ.σ] τ ebool e→ : σ[τ/γ]
Because the type of a typecase term can depend upon
the scrutinized constructor τ, an annotation, [γ.σ], is re-
quired for type checking.
2.4 Soundness
λSECi has the basic property expected from a typed
language, that well-typed programs will not go wrong.
Theorem 2.1 (Type Safety). If ` e : σ then e either
evaluates to a value or diverges.
The theorem is proven syntactically using the stan-
dard progress and preservation lemmas [20]. Details
can be found in the extended version of this paper [19].
3 Generalizing parametricity
Reynold’s parametricity theorem has long been used
to reason about programs in languages with parametric
polymorphism [13]. For example, the theorem can be
used to show that different implementations of an ab-
stract datatype do not influence the behavior of the pro-
gram or to show that external modules cannot forge val-
ues of abstract types. These are only a few of the corol-
laries of the parametricity theorem. This sections starts
with an overview of the standard parametricity theorem,
and then examine how it can be generalized for λSECi.
Proofs for the lemmas and theorems that follow be can
found in the extended version of this paper [19].
α 7→ R ∈ η v1Rv2
η ` v1 ∼ v2 : α
lr:var
η ` v ∼ v : bool lr:bool
∀(η ` e1 ≈ e2 : σ1).η ` v1e1 ≈ v2e2 : σ2
η ` v1 ∼ v2 : σ1 → σ2 lr:arr
∀τ1, τ2.∀R ∈ τ1 ↔ τ2.
η, α 7→ R ` v1[τ1] ≈ v2[τ2] : σ
η ` v1 ∼ v2 : ∀α:?.σ
lr:all
e1 ;
∗
v1 e2 ;
∗
v2 η ` v1 ∼ v2 : σ
η ` e1 ≈ e2 : σ
lr:term
e1 ↑ e2 ↑
η ` e1 ≈ e2 : σ
lr:divr
Figure 3. Logically related terms
3.1 Parametricity
For pedagogical purposes, this section and and the fol-
lowing section considers only the core of λSECi without
type constructors, security labels, or type analysis. That
is, a simple predicative polymorphic λ-calculus. None
of the results presented in these sections are new. Infor-
mally, the parametricity theorem states that well-typed
expressions, after applying related substitutions for their
free type and term variables, are related to themselves.
The power of the theorem comes from the fact that terms
typed by universally quantified type variables can be re-
lated by any relation. Section 3.2 considers some impor-
tant corollaries of this theorem for reasoning about data
abstraction in programs.
The logical relation used by the parametricity theo-
rem is defined in Figure 3. Terms are related with the
judgment η ` e1 ≈ e2 : σ, read as “terms e1 and
e2 are related at type σ with respect to the relations in
η.” The relation between values is similarly defined as
η ` v1 ∼ v2 : σ. Because these relations are defined in-
ductively over types which potentially contain free type
variables, the relations are parameterized by a map, η,
between type variables and binary relations on values.
This map is used when σ is a type variable (see rule
lr:var).
If σ is bool, the relation is identity. Typical for logi-
cal relations, values of function type are related only if
when applied to related arguments, they produce related
results. Terms are related if they evaluate to related val-
ues or both diverge. We write e ↑ to denote divergence.
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∀α:? ∈ ∆?.(η(α) ∈ δ1(α)↔ δ2(α))
η ` δ1 ≈ δ2 : ∆?
tslr:base
∀x:σ ∈ Γ.(η ` γ1(x) ≈ γ2(x) : σ)
η ` γ1 ≈ γ2 : Γ
slr:base
Figure 4. Substitutions for parametricity
The most important rule defines the relationship be-
tween values of type ∀α:?.σ. Polymorphic values are
related if their instantiations with any pair of types are
related. Furthermore, we can use any relation R between
values of those types as the relation on α. We use the no-
tation R ∈ τ1 ↔ τ2 to mean that R is a binary relation on
values of type τ1 and of type τ2. If quantification over
types of higher kind were allowed, R must be a function
on relations. This extension is orthogonal to our result,
so we restrict ourselves to polymorphism over kind ?.
To state the parametricity theorem, we must define
the notion of related substitutions for types and related
terms. In Figure 4, the rule tslr:base states that a relation
mapping η is well-formed with respect to two type sub-
stitutions δ1 and δ2 for the variables in the type context
∆?. There are no restrictions on the range of the type
substitutions. On the other hand, slr:base requires that a
pair of term substitutions for the variables in Γ must map
to related terms. Even though λSECi has call-by-value
semantics, term substitutions must map to terms, not val-
ues. Otherwise, it would it be impossible to prove the
case for fix-points which requires a term substitution.
With these definitions it is possible to state the para-
metricity theorem for our restricted language:
Theorem 3.1 (Parametricity). If ∆? | Γ ` e : σ and
η ` δ1 ≈ δ2 : ∆? and η ` γ1 ≈ γ2 : Γ then η `
δ1(γ1(e)) ≈ δ2(γ2(e)) : σ.
The proof is by induction on the typing judgment.
One significant complication in the proof is circular-
ity in relating fix-points. To escape this problem we ap-
ply a syntactic technique from Pitts [11]. We define a re-
stricted fix-point that can only be unfolded a finite num-
ber of times before diverging. The term fixn+1 x:σ.e
unwinds to e[(fixn x:σ.e)/x]. By definition fix0 x:σ.e al-
ways diverges. It is then straightforward to show that for
any n, fixn x:σ.e is related to itself. Then the following
continuity lemma can be used to prove that unbounded
fix-points are related to themselves.
Lemma 3.2 (Continuity). If η ` δ1 ≈ δ2 : ∆? and
for all n, η ` fixn x:σ1.e1 ≈ fixn x:σ2.e2 : σ where
δ1(σ) = σ1,δ2(σ) = σ2 then η ` fix x:σ1.e1 ≈
fix x:σ2.e2 : σ.
3.2 Applications of the parametricity theorem
The parametricity theorem has been used for many
purposes, most famously for deriving free theorems
about functions in the polymorphic λ-calculus, just by
looking at their types [18]. Our purpose is more simi-
lar to that of Reynolds: reasoning about the properties
of programs in the presence of type abstraction. While
Reynolds separated parametric polymorphism from ad-
hoc polymorphism, we show how to generalize his work
to both sorts of polymorphism.
Corollaries of Theorem 3.1 provide important results
for reasoning about abstract types in programs. Many
specific properties can be proven as a consequence of
parametricity, but we believe the following two are rep-
resentative of what a programmer desires.
Corollary 3.3 (Confidentiality). If α:? | x:α ` e : bool
and ` v1 : τ1 and ` v2 : τ2 then e[τ1/α][v1/x] ;∗ v
iff e[τ2/α][v2/x];∗ v.
This first corollary says that a programmer is free to
change the implementation of an abstract type without
affecting the behavior of a program. It is the essence
behind parametric polymorphism—type information is
not allowed to influence program execution and values
of abstract type must be treated parametrically.
Corollary 3.4 (Integrity). If α:? | · ` e : α then e must
diverge.
This second corollary states that there is no way for
a program to invent values of an abstract type, violating
the integrity of the abstraction.
3.3 Parametricity and type analysis
Consider the following λSECi term (eliding labels):
typecase [γ.bool] α true (Λα:?.Λβ:?.false)
This term violates Corollary 3.3, because we can sub-
stitute bool and bool → bool for α and it will produce
different values: true versus false.
Still, we would like to state properties similar to
Corollaries 3.3 and 3.4 for λSECi. It is not possible to
directly extend the inductive proof for typecase. The
proof would require that the two terms would produce re-
lated results, even when they may analyze different con-
structors. Furthermore, λSECi presents another complica-
tion: The weak-head normal forms of types include (for
example) Typerec with its scrutinee a variable. There-
fore, the logical relation must be extended to include
these sorts of types.
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`1 6v `0
ν1 ∼`0 ν2 : ?
`1
tslr:type-opaq
`1 v `0
bool ∼`0 bool : ?
`1
tslr:type-bool
`1 unionsq `2 v `3 `3 v `0
τ1 ≈`0 τ3 : ?`1 τ2 ≈`0 τ4 : ?`2
τ1 → τ2 ∼`0 τ3 → τ4 : ?`3 tslr:type-arr
∀(τ1 ≈`0 τ2 : κ1).ν1τ1 ≈`0 ν2τ2 : κ2 unionsq `1
ν1 ∼`0 ν2 : κ1
`1→ κ2 tslr:arr
τ1 ;
∗
ν1 τ2 ;
∗
ν2 ν1 ∼`0 ν2 : κ
τ1 ≈`0 τ2 : κ
tsclr:base
Figure 5. Logically related constructors
To solve the problem with typecase, we require that
the constructors used to instantiate polymorphic types
be related to each other, as defined in the next subsection.
Labeling kinds is the key to making this change practical,
because it means the relation need not be the identity re-
lation when types are used parametrically. The need for
extra rules to handle additional weak-head normal form
types is solved by generalizing the trick of quantifying
over all relations between values of given types, to quan-
tifying over families of relations on values of the correct
types.
3.4 Related constructors
The first step towards a generalized parametricity the-
orem is formalizing what it means for type constructors
to be related. We write τ1 ≈` τ2 : κ to mean closed
constructors τ1 and τ2 are related at kind κ with respect
to an observer at level ` in the label lattice. Similarly, the
judgment ν1 ∼` ν2 : κ indicates that closed weak-head
normal constructors ν1 and ν2 are related at kind κ with
respect to an observer at level `. The grammar of weak-
head normal constructors and relations on constructors
is defined in Figures 6 and 5, respectively.
The rule for type functions, tslr:arr, is standard for
logical relations. There are three rules for kind ?. The
first rule, tslr:type-opaq, codifies that if the label of the
constructors is higher than the observer, then the con-
structors are indistinguishable. The remaining two rules
state that if the label of a primitive constructor is less
than the observer, their components must appear related
to the observer. Constructors not in normal form are re-
constructor contexts
ρ ::= • | Typerec ρ τbool τ→ | ρ τ
weak-head normal-form constructors
ν ::= bool | τ1 → τ2 | λα:κ.τ
weak-head normal-form types
ζ ::= (bool)` | (ρ{α})` | σ1 `→ σ2 | ∀`1α:?`2 .σ
Figure 6. Additional syntactic forms
τ; τ
′
(τ)` ; (τ ′)` (τ1 → τ2)` ; (τ1)` `→ (τ2)`
Figure 7. Type reduction
lated by tsclr:base if and only if their weak-head normal
forms are related.
As suggested by tslr:type-opaq, if two constructors
carry information more restrictive than the level of the
observer, the observer shouldn’t be able to tell them
apart. For example, bool : ?> and bool → bool : ?>,
which carry “high-security” information>, will be indis-
tinguishable to an observer at a “low-security” level ⊥.
This is formalized in the following lemma.
Lemma 3.5 (Obliviousness for constructors). If `
τ1, τ2 : κ and L(κ) 6v `0 then τ1 ≈`0 τ2 : κ.
Finally, we can state a substitution theorem for con-
structors that is a simpler version of parametricity:
Lemma 3.6 (Substitution for constructors). If ∆ ` τ :
κ and δ1 ≈`0 δ2 : ∆ then δ1(τ) ≈`0 δ2(τ) : κ.
In this lemma, related type substitutions map type
variables to related constructors, as defined in the fol-
lowing rule
∀α:κ ∈ ∆.(δ1(α) ≈`0 δ2(α) : κ)
δ1 ≈`0 δ2 : ∆
3.5 Related terms
As with constructors, we parameterize the logical re-
lation on terms by an observer `. We write η ` e1 ≈`
e2 : σ to indicate that terms e1 and e2 are related to
an observer at level ` at type σ, with the relation map-
ping η. As with constructors we distinguish between
related terms and related normal forms, writing the judg-
ment η ` v1 ∼` v2 : ζ to indicate that values v1 and
v2 are related to an observer at level ` at the weak-head
normal type ζ, with the relation mapping η. These rela-
tions, as defined in Figure 8, are similar to the ones in
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α 7→ R ∈ η `1 v `0 =⇒ v1R`1ρ v2
η ` v1 ∼`0 v2 : (ρ{α})`1
slr:var
`1 v `0 =⇒ v1 = v2
η ` v1 ∼`0 v2 : (bool)`1
slr:bool
∀(η ` e1 ≈`0 e2 : σ1).
η ` v1e1 ≈`0 v2e2 : σ2 unionsq `1
η ` v1 ∼`0 v2 : σ1
`1→ σ2 slr:arr
∀(τ1 ≈`0 τ2 : ?`2).
∀(R`2ρ ∈ δ1((ρ{τ1})`2)↔ δ2((ρ{τ2})`2)).
η, α 7→ R ` v1[τ1] ≈`0 v2[τ2] : σ unionsq `1
R consistent
η ` v1 ∼`0 v2 : ∀`1α:?`2 .σ
slr:all
e1 ;
∗
v1
e2 ;
∗
v2 σ;
∗
ζ η ` v1 ∼`0 v2 : ζ
η ` e1 ≈`0 e2 : σ
sclr:term
(e1 ↑) ∨ (e2 ↑)
η ` e1 ≈`0 e2 : σ
sclr:divr
Figure 8. Logically related terms
Figure 3. One difference is that we relate only values at
weak-head normal types ζ, defined in Figure 6. Restrict-
ing the value relation to weak-head normal types makes
the logical relation much easier to state and understand.
Like constructors, the relation over terms is defined
so that terms typed at a level greater than the observer
will be indistinguishable. This is enforced by the pre-
condition `1 v `0 found in slr:var and slr:bool. The an-
tecedent relations in slr:arr and slr:all have their types
joined with `1; this accounts for information gained by
destructing the value. The following lemma verifies our
intuition about indistinguishability:
Lemma 3.7 (Obliviousness for terms). If ∆? | · `
e1, e2 : σ and δ1 ≈`0 δ2 : ∆? and L(σ) 6v `0 then
η ` δ1(e1) ≈`0 δ2(e2) : σ.
There are two other significant differences between
Figures 3 and 8: additional preconditions in slr:all and
generalizing lr:var to slr:var. The rule slr:var solves the
problem with Typerec appearing in the weak-head nor-
mal form of types. It generalizes lr:var to terms related at
a constructor that cannot be normalized further because
of an undetermined type variable. We characterize these
constructors with constructor contexts, ρ, defined in Fig-
ure 6. Contexts are holes •, Typerecs of a context, or
a context applied to an arbitrary constructor. We write
ρ{τ} for filling a context’s hole with τ.
Previously, values were related at a type variable
only if they were in the relation mapped to that vari-
able by η. Here η maps to families of relations. We
write R`ρ for the application of R to a label ` and a con-
text ρ, yielding a relation. Therefore, when we write
R`ρ ∈ δ1((ρ{τ1})`) ↔ δ2((ρ{τ2})`) we mean that R is
a dependent function of ` and ρ yielding a relation on
values of type δ1((ρ{τ1})`) and δ2((ρ{τ2})`).
Quantification over R is required to be consistent. In
this context, that means if v1R`1ρ v2 and `1 v `2 then
v1R
`2
ρ v2. This is adequate for call-by-value because
quantification is over families of value relations. There-
fore requiring that R yield relations that are strict or pre-
serve least-upper bounds is unnecessary, as values are al-
ways terminating. It is important that the logical relation
itself is consistent, that is, closed under subsumption.
Lemma 3.8 (Term relation consistent). If δ1 ≈`0 δ2 :
∆? and η ` ∆? and ∆? ` σ1 ≤ σ2 and η ` e1 ≈`0 e2 :
σ1 then η ` e1 ≈`0 e2 : σ2.
We write η ` ∆? to mean that the mapping η is well-
formed with respect to a pair of type substitutions, δ1
and δ2, as defined in the rule:
η(α) consistent
∀α:?`1 ∈ ∆?.(η(α)`1ρ ∈ δ1((ρ{α})`1)↔ δ2((ρ{α})`1))
η ` ∆?
The last significant difference in Figure 3 is in slr:divr.
Terms are related if either diverges, as opposed to our ear-
lier definition where divergent terms were related only
to other divergent terms. This is a significant theoreti-
cal weakening. In particular, the logical relation is no
longer transitive. However, this definition is standard
for information-flow logical relations proofs with recur-
sion [1, 21]. Furthermore, we believe that this weaken-
ing is acceptable in practice. We discuss in more detail
in Section 3.6 how this requirement is merely an artifact
of call-by-value information-flow.
3.6 Generalized parametricity
Before stating the generalized parametricity theorem,
we must define a notation of related term substitutions.
Given related type substitutions, δ1 ≈`0 δ2 : ∆?, and
a well-formed mapping, η ` ∆?, term substitutions are
related if they map variables to related terms.
∀x:σ ∈ Γ.(η ` γ1(x) ≈`0 γ2(x) : σ)
η ` γ1 ≈`0 γ2 : Γ
The only change from slr:base is the additional of a label
`0 for the observer.
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Theorem 3.9 (Generalized parametricity). If ∆? | Γ `
e : σ and δ1 ≈`0 δ2 : ∆? and η ` ∆? and η ` γ1 ≈`0
γ2 : Γ then η ` δ1(γ1(e)) ≈`0 δ2(γ2(e)) : σ.
As with standard parametricity, the proof is by induc-
tion over ∆? | Γ ` e : σ. In addition to the lemmas
mentioned in Sections 3.4 and 3.5, Lemma 3.2 must be
extended in the straightforward manner.
We call Theorem 3.9 generalized parametricity be-
cause Theorem 3.1 can be (almost) recovered by a series
of restrictions:
• Use a two element lattice, ⊥ and >, where ⊥ v >.
• For every κ in ∆?, Γ , e, and σ require L(κ) = >.
• For every σ ′ in Γ , e, and σ require L(σ ′) = ⊥.
• Require that the observer be ⊥.
Even with these restrictions, because of the difference
in sclr:divr, Theorem 3.9 makes a weaker claim about the
termination behavior of related terms than Theorem 3.1.
Consider the generalized version of Corollary 3.3.
Corollary 3.10 (Confidentiality). If α:?> | x:α ` e :
(bool)⊥ then for any ` v1 : τ1 and ` v2 : τ2 if
e[τ1/α][v2/x] and e[τ2/α][v2/x] both terminate, they
will produce the same value.
This corollary states that what we substitute for α and
x will not affect the value computed by e. However, it
is possible that our choice of α and x could cause e to
diverge.
Unlike standard parametricity, Theorem 3.9 has an
explicit observer. Standard parametricity has an implicit
observer that can observe all computation. What makes
information-flow techniques work is that some compu-
tations are opaque to the observer. Furthermore, the re-
sults of these computations are also inaccessible to the
observer, making them effectively dead code. However,
because the operational semantics is call-by-value, dead
code must be executed even though the result is never
used. Therefore, we conjecture that using a call-by-need
operational semantics an exact correspondence could be
recovered; the only part of the proof that would need to
change is obliviousness for terms, Lemma 3.7.
3.7 Applications of generalized parametricity
A typical corollary of Theorem 3.9 is normally called
noninterference; that it is possible to substitute values in-
distinguishable to the observer and get indistinguishable
results.
Corollary 3.11 (Noninterference). If ·, x:σ1 ` e : σ2
where L(σ1) 6v L(σ2) then for any ` v1 : σ1 and `
v2 : σ1 it is the case that if both e[v1/x] and e[v2/x]
terminate, they will both produce the same value
More importantly, it is also possible to restate the
corollaries of standard parametricity. The previous sub-
section stated the revised corollary for confidentiality.
The same can be done for integrity:
Corollary 3.12 (Integrity). If α:?> | · ` e : (α)⊥ then
e must diverge.
Furthermore, it is also possible to make much richer
and refined claims because the label lattice expands
upon the implicit two level lattice used by parametricity.
4 Related work
λSECi draws heavily upon previous work on type anal-
ysis, parametricity, and information flow.
Most information flow systems use a lattice model
originating from work by Bell and LaPadula [3] and
Denning [4]. Volpano et al. [16] showed that Denning’s
work could be formulated as type system and proved its
soundness with respect to noninterference. Heintze and
Riecke’s formalized information-flow and integrity in a
typed λ-calculus with references, the SLam calculus [7],
and proved a number of soundness and noninterference
results. Pottier and Simonet have developed an exten-
sion to ML, called FlowCaml, and have shown noninter-
ference using an alternative syntactic technique [12].
Prior to our research, FlowCaml was the only lan-
guage with polymorphism and a noninterference proof.
FlowCaml does not consider run-time type analysis and
can rely on standard parametricity for types. The nonin-
terference result for λSECi directly builds upon the meth-
ods of Zdancewic [21] and Pitts [11].
Other researchers have noticed the connection be-
tween parametricity and noninterference. The work of
Tse and Zdancewic [15] compliments our research by
showing how parametricity can be used to prove nonin-
terference. Tse and Zdancewic do so by encoding Abadi,
et al.’s [1] dependency core calculus into System F.
The fact that run-time type analysis (and other forms
of ad-hoc polymorphism) breaks parametricity has been
long understood, but little has been done to reconcile the
two. Leifer et al. [8] design a system that preserves type
abstraction in the presence of (un)marshalling. This is
a weaker result because marshalling is merely a single
instance of an operation using run-time type analysis.
Rossberg [14] and Vytiniotis et al. [17] use generative
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types to hide type information in the presence of run-
time analysis, relying on colored-brackets [5] to provide
easy access. However, none of this work has formalized
the abstraction properties that their systems provide.
5 Conclusion
With λSECi, we address the conflict between run-time
type analysis and enforceable data abstractions. By la-
beling their type abstractions, software developers can
easily observe dependencies.
However, this refinement comes at with the penalty
of having to write many annotations for a program to
type check. We have not investigated how pervasive the
necessary annotations will prove in practice. Existing
large scale languages, such as Jif [9] and FlowCaml [12],
implement some form of information-flow inference, but
they can be difficult to use. Languages based on λSECi
have the advantage that if the only goal is to secure type
abstractions and no type analysis is performed, then no
information-flow annotations are necessary. Regardless,
it will be imperative to study the cost of maintaining the
necessary annotations in practical languages based upon
λSECi.
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